Abstract. To efficiently solve safety verification and testing problems for an aspect-oriented system, we use multitape automata to model aspects and propose algorithms for the aspect-oriented system specified by a number of primary labeled transition systems (some of them are black-boxes) and aspects. Our algorithms combine automata manipulations over the aspects and primary systems with black-box testing over each individual black-box, but without generating the woven system.
Introduction
Aspect-oriented Programming (AOP) [1] has been considered among "ten emerging areas of technology that will soon have a profound impact on the economy and on how we live and work" [14] . In a software system, a concern is understood as a property of interest. Separation of concerns has long been regarded as a main principle in software engineering. A concern can be implemented as a component (if it can be cleanly encapsulated in a generalized procedure or object) or as a cross-cutting aspect (if otherwise; e.g., a security aspect interleaved with several components) [1] . In AOP, primary systems can be woven with aspects into woven systems -final executables -by aspect weavers. This process is called weaving, which has provided a new way to compose a complex system, whose reusability, extensibility and adaptability may also be increased. The successes of AOP at the code level (e.g., AspectJ [2] ) have also inspired researchers to study methodologies in aspect-oriented design that bring in cross-cutting concerns even at earlier software development stages [9, 10, 8, 12, 3, 4] .
Despite its convenience in addressing cross-cutting concerns, introducing aspects into a system on the other hand raises a quality assurance issue in the woven system: how to assure that a collection of aspects really add the functionality they are supposed to, and moreover, do not invalidate desirable properties of the primary system to which the aspects are woven? That is, we would like to assure that aspects perform their intended behavioral modifications over the primary system without producing any undesirable side effects. Theoretically, it is clear that, once a primary system is given, a well-specified aspect (we assume that the aspect "knows" how to weave) will give us a construction on the woven system. Therefore, the quality assurance problem is essentially a verification problem and verification techniques like model checking [5] can be applied on the woven system directly. However, this direct approach has serious issues: -Before the model-checking starts on the woven system, one has to wait till the woven system is constructed. But when the model-checking actually starts, the state space in the woven system may have already exploded, in particular when nested weaving is involved. -When the primary system contains components that are black-boxes (such as a COTS component, whose source code or design details are unavailable), a woven system may not even be available.
To address the issues, in this paper, we study fundamental algorithms that are possible to verify/test an aspect-oriented system or design, but without weaving (i.e., without constructing the woven system).
In our study, a system or design is modeled as a labeled transition system. An aspect is a multitape automaton, or more precisely, the tuple language accepted by the automaton. It characterizes how behaviors of several primary systems can be woven into a behavior of the woven system. We then define an aspect-oriented system as a tree whose leaves are primary systems and nonterminal nodes are aspects. As defined in the paper, the woven system, also denoted by , can be constructed through automata manipulations (assuming that the automata for the aspects as well as the primary systems are of finite-state). We study the safety verification problem as follows: Given a regular set
(of event sequences), whether the woven system has a behavior in
. Our safety verification algorithm is a top-down and then bottom-up process that explores the structure of the tree (using automata manipulations), during which a regular may cause false negatives on the verification results. References [9, 10, 8, 12, 3] extend the UML (Unified Modeling Language) to support aspect-oriented design, where the primary system and aspects can be woven at the design level. However, since the semantics of UML is not formal in general, the woven design can not be faithfully verified. To address the issue, some researchers seek to translate a subclass of aspect-oriented UML to a formal specification language associated with a formal analysis tool. For instance, in [4] , performance is modeled as an aspect using aspect-oriented UML which is translated into Rapide ADL [15] to evaluate if the woven system satisfies a time-response requirement. Reference [17] adapts a role-based aspect-oriented modeling method for aspect-oriented UML design and uses Alloy, a lightweight formal specification language and analysis tool, to verify the woven system. However, as pointed out by authors, the translation from UML to Alloy was done manually and only worked for some special cases.
Our approach is totally different from all approaches we mentioned above. Our safety verification and testing algorithms verify and test aspect-oriented systems without constructing the actual woven systems. We also believe that our formal approach of using multitape automata and their manipulations in studying verification problems of aspect-oriented systems is also new: this approach will also make research results that are already established in automata theory be available in analyzing aspects and aspect-oriented systems, e.g., aspects that are of infinite-state.
Our algorithms are also related to our decompositional testing algorithms [6] for concurrent systems containing black-box components. In these latter algorithms which are inspired by the decompositional verification ideas by Giannakopoulou et. al. [7] , test sequences are generated and run on a concurrent component that are customized to its specific deployment environment. Since blackbox testing (instead of verification) is used in [6] , unlike the framework in [7] , the testing algorithms in [6] does not require a complete specification about a component to be incorporated into the concurrent system. On the other hand, we study decompositional testing algorithms for aspect-oriented systems in this paper instead of concurrent systems in [6] .
Systems, Transactions, and Aspects
In this paper, a system is a (nondeterministic) labeled transition system, where its labels, called (external) events, are drawn from a given finite alphabet 
, a number of requirements of must be met (e.g., one needs to distinguish input events and output events in , one might want to assume that is input deterministic, has an implementation to run, etc.; see [13] for a comprehensive survey on black-box testing). For ease of presentation, we simply assume that the black-box has already met all the necessary requirements such that the black-box testing procedure
does exist and is given. As we all know, black-box testing can even run on infinite-state systems.
An important class of verification queries, called the safety verification problem, is as follows:
Given: a system and a set
s pecifies a set of bad transactions that are not supposed to be the transactions of . Clearly, a negative answer to the Question indicates an error in the system with respect to its requirement specified as "no
transactions". Automatatheoretic model-checking techniques can be used to solve the safety verification problem when both and
are in certain restricted forms. In particular, when is a finite-state system and
is a regular set, the problem can be solved. When is a black-box, the safety verification problem can not be solved in general. In this case, black-box testing can be used to obtain an inconclusive answer as follows. We assume that a procedure
i s given which returns a set of words. Each word I that is in the set and in
is then run on the testing procedure
r eturns "yes"), then a negative answer to the Question in the safety verification problem is identified. Otherwise, the answer is inconclusive. The set of tests that ¤ " ! ¢ ¥ ¤ " ¦ ¦ generates has to be finite (patience of a test engineer is practically bounded). In practice, it is still an ongoing research issue in Software Engineering on how to define an "adequate"
, in particular when is a grey-box (with partial information on its transition graph known). Nevertheless, in this paper, we assume that such a banking system, a customer can open and close a bank account. With a bank account, the customer can login to the system and perform a number of atomic accesses on the bank account, then logout the system. An atomic access can be any one of withdraw, deposit or getBlance on the account. According to Figure In aspect-oriented software development, an aspect can be understood as a structural transformer (e.g., a program transformer in AspectJ) or a behavioral transformer (a relation between event sequences). We use the latter understanding in this paper and thus an aspect is called a behavioral aspect. The semantics of the aspect, which is specified by the relation, is independent of the syntax (i.e., the transition graph) and the semantics (i.e., the behaviors) of a primary system . Therefore, even without the primary system , one can still design an aspect. Also, it guarantees that the semantics of the woven system does not change whenever the semantics of the primary system does not change. In the following, we will present a formal definition of an aspect, which can be applied to several primary systems (e.g., "interleaving" can be considered as an aspect that weaves two systems into one where the two systems run concurrently).
Formally, a 
, is the set of all words I f such that there are transactions 
. Notice that, even though a behavioral aspect is independent of the transition graphs of the primary systems, as an exercise in computability theory, one can show that a computable weaving function always exists and can be constructed for a given recursively enumerable behavioral aspect, when the primary systems are given as Turing machines (or any other universal computing devices). That is, the existence of such a computable weaving function tells us that, in the most general sense, a woven system can be constructed automatically from primary systems using a behavioral aspect.
Finite-state Behavioral Aspects and Weaving
We now study finite-state behavioral aspects that are tuple languages accepted by multitape finite automata. A (nondeterministic) multitape finite automaton consists of a finite control and 
-tuple language accepted by . In this case, we sometimes abuse the as the . Now let us go back to the simple banking system example. As the simple banking system evolves, the requirement changes. Developers might be asked to add a new feature to the system: Every atomic access to an account should be logged by recording the name of the accessing customer and the type of the access in a log file. This logging feature is a typical example of a crosscutting concern, which can not be easily represented in an object-oriented design as it interleaves the same feature into every atomic access in the original simple banking system. Adding such a feature is best supported by aspect-oriented software development. In this example, we use a logging aspect to implement this feature. The logging aspect is quite simple. Figure 2 shows how the logging aspect can be modeled as a deterministic two-tape automaton . has two states¨ and¨S and two transitions between them. For transition from¨ to¨S , the two tapes of read same input; for the transition from¨S to¨ , the first tape reads nothing and the second tape reads log as input. As a result, whenever there is an atomic access in primary behavior, there is a same atomic access appended by a log event in woven behavior. 
. Apply the weaving process to the simple banking system in Figure 1 and the logging aspect in Figure 2 , the woven system is shown in Figure 3 . 
Safety Verification and Testing of Aspect-Oriented Systems
At the heart of aspect-oriented software development methodology, aspects are used along with multiple primary systems to construct a final woven system through (nested) weaving. One can raise the same safety verification problem for the woven system. However, one of the difficulties now is how to deal with the case when some of the primary systems are black-boxes (a white-box can also be marked as a black-box when its behaviors are hard to analyze; e.g., some infinite-state systems. 
, where is the behavioral aspect originally labeled on § . The final woven system of is then specified by the woven system associated with the root node 7 7
; i.e., . Sometimes, we simply use itself to indicate the " 3 @ 9 A 9 B 1
. Figure 4 (a) shows an with four primary systems and three aspects.
Safety Verification Algorithm for Aspect-Oriented Systems
The safety verification problem for aspect-oriented systems is to decide whether an aspect-oriented system has a bad transaction in a given regular set ¡ ¢ ¤ ). Therefore, it is desirable to design a verification algorithm where the verification result can be established earlier (e.g., before the entire woven system is calculated) whenever it is possible. To this end, we present a safety verification algorithm verifyAOS( , 
is empty then 16: return "yes" and exit 17:
end if
18: end if
Due to space limitation, we omit the correctness proof of the algorithm. Notice that, in our algorithm presentation, set operations, such as emptiness testing, intersection, and . Accordingly,
these set operations can be implemented using the corresponding automata manipulations. One can also prove that, in worst case, the time complexity of our algorithm is , our algorithm's worst-case time complexity is the same as the naive one, not to mention the additional benefit of possible earlier termination when worst-cases do not happen.
Safety Testing Algorithm for Aspect-Oriented Systems
When some of the primary systems are black-boxes (whose state number could be infinite), the safety testing problem for is exactly the safety verification problem for in which each black-boxes is replaced with a finite-state system B w hose transactions are exactly those in
c ould return a huge set of tests (such as strings on ¡ not longer than 40), the safety testing problem is to seek a definite yes/no answer. In this case, one would follow the naive approach by first testing each black-box using the tests generated from
a nd then replacing the with a system whose behavior is exactly those successful tests. However, exhaustive testing of the entire test set
It is desirable to have an algorithm using the tree as well as the set
b efore actual tests are run on the (i.e., tests on a black-box are tailored to the specific safety testing problem of ). Furthermore, successful tests themselves are valuable information on the actual behavior of . This information should be used to further trim away unnecessary tests performed over other black-boxes. To this end, we propose a safety testing algorithm testAOS( ,¡ 
is empty then 9:
return "yes" and exit 10: end if 11:
set . Each non-root node is associated with a @ using Project operations. When the node is a white-box node, i.e. , after testing, is a white-box now). 
) and propagate(
) work together to make sure that, after a black-box is tested, the test results (the successful tests) are used to create a smaller test set for each of the remaining black-boxes yet to be tested.
Again, due to space limitation, the correctness prove of the algorithm is omitted. Similarly, in the algorithm, all the set operations can be implemented through automata manipulations. It is hard to conduct a precise complexity analysis for the safety testing algorithm, since the test results for a black-box affect the test sets that will be run over the other black-boxes. At least when there is no black-box,¤ § ¦ ¡ ¢ ¤
does not perform worse than
. It is reasonable to assume that black-box testing is expensive, in particular when one exhaustively runs every test from a huge (e.g., § © W¨ i n [6] ) test set generated from ¤ § ! ¢ ¤ § ¦ ¦
. The saved testing time resulted from eliminating a large number of unnecessary tests from the test set would well make up the overhead of calculating the unnecessary tests using our algorithm$¤ " ¦ ¡ ¢ ¥ ¤
. For instance, concurrent composition (through interleaving) can be considered as a concurrency aspect (though it is very special). The case-study performed in [6] is a very special case of our safety testing algorithm that runs over one white-box and three black-boxes and with only one 4-ary concurrency aspect (which is the root). The case-study shows that a huge test set with § © W¨ t ests is reduced into a set with § ¢ tests after removing all unnecessary tests. On the other hand, state-space explosion seems unavoidable when a even larger test set is selected. In that case-study, automata manipulations (for the concurrency aspect and tests results) failed to complete. We would anticipate similar experimental results for our safety testing algorithm¤ § ¦ © ¡ ¢ ¤ .
Conclusions
In this paper, we use multitape automata to model aspects and study verification and testing algorithms for an aspect-oriented system specified by a number of primary labeled transition systems (some of them are black-boxes) and aspects. Our algorithms combine automata manipulations with black-box testing over each individual blackbox, but without generating the woven system. In a forthcoming paper, we are going to implement the algorithms and perform casestudies in order to justify the real-world efficiency of the algorithms. The authors thank Anneliese Andrews and Curtis Dyreson for discussions.
